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THE PRIMACY OF INDEX IN NAMING PARADIGMS. PART II
This analysis highlights the semiotic naming differences between the pronouns, nouns, and 
verbs. It capitalizes on the role of Peirce’s Object in assigning names and the special character 
of pronouns and verbs to hasten notice of Objects. It showcases Peirce’s indexical sign as an 
individuating instrument, by arguing that nouns do not name the Object uniquely. The invoking 
notice of shifting places via pronouns/verbs is paramount. 
Naming begins with the most pure Indexes (pronouns), then nouns (which draw upon 
similar features); afterward, verbs emerge to name the dynamic event profile, illustrating the 
indispensability of the index. The advances in deictic individuation establish and reinforce the 
joint attentional ventures: co-signers are compelled not merely to attend to the same Object 
but to recognize distinctive participant roles in events as well. 
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The Power of Peirce’s Object: 
The distinction between “object” in com-
mon parlance and Charles Sanders Peirce’s 
use of the “Object” as a referent of a Sign is 
pivotal. Peirce’s use of “Object” includes: 
tangibles (whether present or absent), 
linguistic entities (such as words), intangi-
bles (including invisible constructs: God, 
angels, monsters, phantasms, imaginary 
friends, and the like), or mental constructs 
such as propositions. Further arguments 
will be proffered as to how pronouns and 
proper names serve as individuals versus 
singulars, as measured by the issues of the 
relative power of Objects to affect the signs. 
To this end, it must be noted that it is the 
Object which monitors semiosis, namely, 
the Object forms the basis for assigning the 
novel Interpretants (West 2013b); the Im-
mediate Object determines its kind (mental 
representations which are fundamentally 
analogic in nature). The Object can predict 
the kind of sign which issues (Index, Icon, 
or Symbol). Finally, it is the Object which 
establishes the need for concurrent sign use, 
when the supplementation of a second sign 
is warranted to clarify the intended referent. 
In short, within the Object lies the impetus 
to call up the stored conceptual representa-
tions (signs or Interpretants) in the form of 
semantic memories to enhance the meaning 
construal. Such power resides within the 
Object, as in cases of the Index in spatial 
contiguity with the location of the Object. 
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Objects of Peirce’s individual type 
elicit signs, which can best showcase their 
discreteness and not their commonalities 
with other entities. As such, they select 
“pure” Indexes to highlight their location 
and identity. They are not as likely to se-
lect Symbols, especially at the early stages 
of development when the global percepts 
predominate and when the vocabulary items 
are less enriched by the differentiated real 
world experience. Accordingly, although 
individuals (pronouns, the first instances of 
proper names) do not constitute names in 
the strict, classic sense of naming, in that 
their lack of obvious physical and func-
tional attributes militates against compar-
ing them with an exemplar and ultimately 
determining into which class of objects they 
best fit. Pronouns and the first instances 
of the proper name do qualify as names 
and names of a rather perfect vintage for 
Peirce. If nouns are “imperfect” specimens 
of individuating, because they “do what the 
pronoun does at once” (1893: 2.287 fn1), 
their naming function is actually superior 
and not inferior, given its natural way of 
naming Objects with attentional signs. 
In fact, Objects of individuals (espe-
cially demonstratives) strip their signs of 
the means to subsist as the best exemplars 
of a class when they are used instead of 
the singulars. The choice of “that” (com-
pelled by non-concept-driven Objects) 
for whatever noun (whether observable or 
not) equalizes and perhaps reduces all the 
objects to an identical Object (those which 
are noticed), which is wiped clean of any 
kind of semantic affiliation. This process 
of “wiping clean”, the noun actually ap-
pears to represent the starting point or zero 
point of naming, namely, transforming the 
speaker’s single focus to a joint attentional 
venture. This happens because without this 
attentional paradigm the naming is likely 
to be stripped of its very character, i.e., 
to direct or force attention on an Object. 
It is well-documented that infants will 
not apply novel names to Objects without 
joint attentional success, absent capture 
of another’s attention via gaze and point-
ing (to the other, then to the Object) and 
after securing the other’s focus thereon 
(Tomasello 1999: 62). In view of the Ob-
ject’s need for the joint attentional Indexical 
signs in this early enterprise and in the light 
of the overall primacy of demonstrative 
pronouns in ontogeny, their preeminence 
in the naming process is unquestionable. 
Peirce supports this line of reasoning 
that the pronouns are preeminent in the 
naming process, when he asserts that nouns 
derive from pronouns, not the reverse (as 
many have been assumed). 
It is impossible to express what an asser-
tion refers to except by means of an Index. 
A pronoun is an Index. A noun, on the other 
hand, does not indicate the object it denotes; 
and when a noun is used to show what one is 
talking about, the experience of the hearer is 
relied upon to make up for the incapacity of 
the noun for doing what the pronoun does at 
once. Thus, a noun is an imperfect substitute 
for a pronoun. Nouns also serve to help out 
verbs (1893: 2.287 fn1). 
Peirce is adamant that it is the pronoun 
which has greater means to individuate. 
Thus, nouns (when they replace pronouns) 
are an “imperfect substitute.” Because 
of the exclusive focus on their Object’s 
uniqueness and the legisign’s vague, all-
encompassing nature, pronouns point in a 
universal way, such that they are relatively 
free from semantic wrapping. This com-
pulsive dependence on the pronoun liber-
ates the signer from casting about for the 
most suitable singular sign: a noun which 
classifies the Object. Instead, signers can 
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plug in a demonstrative pronoun and need 
not access stored semantic knowledge. 
Employing “that” in lieu of a noun is quite 
automatic and requires far less on-line 
deliberation. It allows signers to forego the 
process of settling upon a fitting conven-
tional singular sign, which depends upon 
increased conscious control, which is often 
unavailable (given less developed working 
memory skills). 
 “That” represents an easy default or a 
concerted effort to individuate the Object 
via selection of an individual rather than 
a singular to represent the interest of the 
signer in describing the Object’s effect upon 
consciousness. Although the noun individu-
ates its Object, such is not as effectual to 
celebrate the Object’s differentness, when 
compared to the riveting effect of pronouns.
Proper Names as Names: 
Because proper nouns virtually always indi-
viduate, they, likewise, constitute names. In 
fact, they ordinarily individuate in a manner 
which trumps that of common nouns, given 
the proper noun’s heavy dependence on the 
pragmatic factors for interpretation and rela-
tively semantic-free contributions from the 
code. The importance of pragmatic factors 
to interpret proper names makes necessary 
the presence of index (visual gestures) to 
disambiguate the referent, because, unlike 
common nouns, the NP does not inher-
ently connect the referent to other similar 
referents. 
Although definiteness is useful in deter-
mining lexemes suitable for the naming pro-
cess, it does not distinguish between names, 
which refer distinctly to those which require 
semantic, hence, classificatory knowledge. 
Definiteness does not distinguish between 
referents, which are unique and those 
which are “one of a kind”; cf.: “The car is 
in the driveway” with “The Prius is in the 
driveway.”
Despite their differences, proper and 
common nouns bear some similarity. The 
use of proper names, as a species of a noun, 
is apprehended rather early in the develop-
ment (perhaps prior to apprehending com-
mon nouns as names), before 0;7 (Tincoff, 
Jusczyk 1999: 174); but they are recognized 
primarily with reference to familiar persons, 
especially family relations, e.g., Mommy 
or child’s own name. The former does not 
qualify definitively as a proper name; in 
linguistic genres, “vocative” characterizes 
their use (Clark 2009: 315–316). Vocative 
refers to terms used to secure another’s at-
tention as in “gimme dat, Mommy.” Given 
the nature of early proper name use as 
vocatives, they are most often existentially 
connected with their referents: compelling 
the intervention of index to determine the 
referent. This is a characteristic which they 
share with the initial uses of pronouns and 
proper names in non-peripheral uses (exo-
phoric), especially operational in the case of 
demonstratives (cf. West 2013b for further 
foundation). Proper names share several 
other features with pronouns, chief among 
them is their reference to individuals. While 
pronouns refer using the semantic meaning; 
in point of fact, they are in some sense less 
individual than are the proper names in 
nearly every instance of use. For example, 
“this is my favorite meal, not ‘that’ one,” 
categorizes “this” as a near object from the 
speaker’s perspective and “that” as a far 
object, but this spatially contrastive demon-
strative use contains semantic meaning in its 
establishment of the speaker as Origo and 
in its demarcation of near and far distance 
from Origo’s location. In contrast, “Sally is 
my favorite person, not Julia,” hints a little, 
if any, universal semantic commonalities 
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or differences in the meaning, apart from 
the referent-based meaning affiliations. 
Essentially, proper names properly refer to 
individuals independent of their existential 
relationship to their referent, typically 
persons. 
The consensus in the discipline of 
Linguistics for the last fifty years is that 
both pronouns and proper names exude the 
grammatical characteristic of definiteness 
for several reasons: both typically reject 
definite determiners in the same noun 
phrase, neither is ordinarily pluralizable 
(particularly in English), nor is either ever 
a mass noun. Often when the denotative 
function operates the name (proper or other-
wise) has a less designative function. Proper 
names do not merely behave similarly to 
plural generic nouns, at least syntactically, 
in that they do not permit a definite deter-
miner, although generics can appear bare 
or can take definite/indefinite determiners, 
e.g., “dogs (bare generic), a dog/the dog.” 
The following sentences illustrate these 
possibilities: “Dogs are man’s best friend,” 
“A dog is a good friend” and “The dog is 
man’s best friend.” Accordingly, the follow-
ing construction (using proper names in the 
same way) is rather curious, approximating 
an anomaly: “a Paul is a good thing,” but 
one might produce: “a Gibson is a good 
thing.” The latter is possible, given its more 
generic character, i.e., either referring to the 
significant contribution of J. J. and Eleanor 
Gibson to the field of Psychology or refer-
ring to the brand of guitar. In short, both 
generics and proper names often refer to 
ensembles, not merely to single individuals 
(Lyons 1999: 195). In fact, in some cases, 
the generics and proper names behave indis-
tinguishably when they indicate a class, e.g., 
“My dad has a Prius” or “I like Hershey’s 
not Nestlé’s.” In this use, they both refer to a 
collective. Hence, despite their definiteness, 
they are not strictly individuals when they 
express an ensemble. Still, both are definite 
in that they refer to a familiar, identifiable 
and somewhat specific collective whose 
form is impermeable. Nonetheless, they 
are distinguishable from one another syn-
tactically in that the primary uses of proper 
names resist modification by determiners, 
whereas generics welcome their presence 
in the same NP. 
The primary distinction between ge-
nerics and proper names, on the one hand, 
and common nouns, on the other hand, is 
the degree to which the name can refuse to 
coalesce from a referent with discrete form 
into one for which form becomes eroded 
(Macnamara 1982: 139–140). While gener-
ics (inclusive of proper names) refuse to 
coalesce, common nouns may not altogether 
refuse to do so. For example, whereas dogs 
(as generics) do not coalesce, a pebble 
(common noun) can coalesce into gravel 
(Macnamara 1982: 138–140). If, however, 
“Sally” (proper name) were to coalesce 
into “a crowd/group,” “Sally” would lose 
her proper name status. Proper names, as 
in Alice in Wonderland, are incapable of 
coalescing, disbursing with discrete form. 
In sum, the similarity between generics and 
proper names demonstrates the existence of 
blurry demarcations, lending some evidence 
to the claim that proper names belong to the 
category of generics (Lyons 1999: 199). 
The onset of proper names, with respect 
to: generics, common nouns, and pronouns 
(especially of the personal kind), mate-
rializes early on (Clark 2009). This fact 
confirms the existence of spatial primitives 
and Index ontologically. The vocative use 
of proper names typically appears rather 
earlier, within children’s initial fifty words 
(even prior to two word utterances), ordi-
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narily between 1;6 and 2;4 (Lust 2006: 194; 
West 1988: 152–153). The vocative use of 
proper names demonstrates a real presence 
of the Index in the attentional purpose of 
vocatives, calling the name or role desig-
nator of the caregiver to commandeer joint 
enterprises. It appears that, although voca-
tive use can refer to a collective/ensemble 
(e.g., Mommy), children’s initial uses do 
not reflect this. Instead, their referents are 
likely to be individual, attending to a single 
individual and not to the familial role. It is 
not until personal pronouns are used in the 
same manner, to refer to general speaker-lis-
tener roles (cf. West 2013a), that vocatives 
have a role, that of a caregiver. “Mommy” 
and “daddy” refer to perhaps the primary/
only caregiver whom children know and 
filling the subject slot with a proper name 
conforms to what children consider the 
standard, since all sentences appear to in-
clude explicit subjects on the surface level. 
Rather than leaving an imperative without 
an overt subject, they fill the slot with a 
vocative, e.g., “Mommy, come here” rather 
than “come here.” Proper names there are 
the substitutes for non-overt addressee pro-
nouns. In this substitution, children do not 
need to classify addressee role. 
Similarly, prior to and concurrently with 
the use of speaker pronouns, proper names 
are employed in lieu of the speaker’s pro-
nouns (West 1986: 131–132; West 1989: 
40–41; Bloom et al. 1974: 67). Although 
this practice appears to be universal, it 
materializes far more often in certain 
disordered/sensory-impaired populations 
(West 1986: 131–132; West 1989: 40–41). 
Blind children without any concomitant 
abnormalities were still employing this 
proper name substitution for their role 
as speaker in the discourse, even at 3;10 
(West 1986: 130–134). These blind children 
likewise substituted third person pronouns 
for speaker self between 2;4 and 3;8 (West 
1989: 40–43), perhaps demonstrating 
some failure to recognize conversational 
roles. In view of blind children’s decreased 
likelihood to be included in conversational 
exchanges, they may be less practiced in 
the pronoun use, especially of the speaker 
vintage and consequently more reliant on 
referring to the persons independent of that 
role, especially themselves, which proper 
name substitution accomplishes. Autistic 
children with reasonable linguistic facility 
perform similarly to the blind children in 
Donna E. West’s study, perhaps for similar 
reasons: they are not as actively sought out 
as conversational partners (Loveland 1993: 
245; Sigman, Capps 1997: 29). Since both 
third person pronouns and proper names 
refer to collectives/ensembles, neither 
population lacks the classificatory skills 
altogether. What appears to be missing is 
the deictic skill to index a participant role, 
not to index an individual. 
Other, still less conventional uses of 
proper names materialize as substitutes 
for the children’s own name. Rather than 
employing first or second person pronouns 
to refer to ego within conversational ex-
changes, children universally use their own 
names (West 1986: 131–132; West 1989: 
40–41). In doing so, they need not to name 
their role(s) as one partner or the other in the 
conversation. Their uses are designative, re-
ferring to self and other without classifying 
speaker/listener roles. In other words, when 
children name themselves within the con-
versational exchange (until 2;10), they do 
not alter individuating self as ego from self 
as a contributor to the speech event. This 
phenomenon demonstrates that although 
children encode themselves as participants 
in the event being reported (the narrated 
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event), they are hard pressed to designate 
their role in the speech event (as “I”); they 
can indicate themselves as doing X (“Sally 
drinks juice”, but not yet as a speaker does 
X (“I drink juice.”) In short, early on the 
children’s use of proper name instead of the 
speaker pronoun short-circuits reference to 
their role as reporter of their own participa-
tion in an event. 
More mainstream uses of the proper 
names reveal an extension of their Inter-
pretants from the individual (referring to a 
single person only) to a generic-based use 
in which apprehension of the name to the 
other persons is viable. This process is likely 
to begin with a recognition that “mommy” 
is used to refer to maternal figures of any 
child. As such, proper names can be deter-
mined to refer to a host of individuals who 
have been accorded that name and even to 
types of inanimates (those which resemble 
animates, e.g., cars and guitars). Inanimates 
are more a subject to proper name associa-
tion after an intimate relationship with them 
has been developed. In fact, it is likely that 
the productive use of generic terms is rela-
tively concurrent with that of more adult-
like proper name uses. What is riveting is 
the fact that children employ count nouns 
(at 1;8) such as “a dog” or “an apple”, which 
have an object-based individuating function 
(Nelson et al. 1993). Although the indi-
viduating function is naturally operational, 
given the children’s propensity to use the 
Index for investigating spatial primitives; 
nonetheless, their facility to individuate is 
enhanced by the count noun naming. When 
an object was named, children were more 
likely to individuate a similar object in an 
array, but when a demonstrative pronoun 
was employed, rather than the common 
count noun, any object was individuated 
from the array including the dissimilar 
objects. For example, similar objects were 
selected after the prompt: “find another 
dax,” than upon: “see this, find another 
one.” Hence, the name in the form of a count 
noun appears to further harness children’s 
propensity to individuate. Nevertheless, 
proper names constitute a quintessential/
basic means to individuate. Unlike count 
nouns, proper names are never employed 
with determiners, nor their individuating 
function is syntactically obvious; nonethe-
less, this function has been operational at 
the earlier ages as well. In fact, no need 
exists to explicitly individuate other than 
by employing the proper name only, since 
proper names encode without a determiner 
what common nouns need a determiner to 
accomplish. Despite their status as types 
of generics (hence, potentially possessing 
some denotative value), proper names im-
plicitly single out a whole object, typically 
a person. Then the proper names encode 
two factors (working in concert) which 
qualify them as early, effective individua-
tors: their discreteness without the presence 
of modifiers and their pragmatic function of 
familiarity with the referent. These defining 
features account for the fact that proper 
names surface so early in the naming pro-
cess: they do not rely on a syntactic facilita-
tor (a determiner) to individuate further; the 
individuating function is intrinsic to their 
status as proper names. 
The orientation toward/recognition of 
the import of individuating as a direct out-
growth of early indexical use via gesture 
provides the foundation for discerning sin-
gle objects/events from an array of its undif-
ferentiated, global features. The propensity 
to perceive whole objects as contributors to 
an outcome places proper names in a unique 
position to encode pre-linguistic quantifica-
tion-based competencies, discerning “sortal 
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objects”/numerosity. At 0;2.5, infants ap-
prehend that an object cannot exist in two 
locations simultaneously (Baillargeon, 
DeVos 1991), suggesting not merely a place 
to object connection but the representation 
of an object as individuated from the others. 
The numerosity skills develop later indicat-
ing recognition of more than one object. The 
existence of numerosity competencies (sen-
sitivity to object separateness) are present 
at 0;7 (Bloom 2001: 166–167), providing 
convincing evidence that individuation 
underlies naming. According to Prentice 
Starkey et al. (1990), this skill entails count-
ing a minimum of three individuals (linear 
dots, photos of household objects, and ac-
tions) demonstrating an early propensity 
to notice individuals. Numerosity extends 
to other modalities—infants (at 1;6), even 
count auditory separations, e.g., matching 
different sounds to the objects (Starkey et 
al. 1990: 122–124). 
Afterwards, the more generic uses of 
proper names and other generic nouns come 
into surface. Because generics often take the 
form of plural nominals, as in “dogs” or “ap-
ples,” their reference to ensembles is gram-
maticalized with the plural “-s.” Singular 
forms can likewise qualify as generics, as in 
“the dog.” These singular forms, however, 
more implicitly refer to a set of collective 
objects (Lyons 1999: 197). The absence of 
an explicit grammatical marker to express 
a whole object set warrants their later ac-
quisition. Although generics individuate, 
such applies to the sets of objects, not to the 
singular items. If they refer to individuals 
at all, their referent pool extends to kinds 
of objects, founded upon higher level of 
analogical reasoning skills. 
As Paul Bloom (2001: 166–167) asserts, 
children’s early notion of individuation 
is broader than their notion of the whole 
objects. Although some truth resides in his 
claim, he misconstrues the essence of “ob-
ject,” restricting it to tangible/observable 
entities, delegitimizing less observable/ab-
stract objects: “shadows,” “jokes,” “holes,” 
and “songs.” The semiotic models that are 
using Peirce’s categories as their standard 
ascribe Object status to all the referents, 
independent of their degree of observability. 
Accordingly, Bloom fails to recognize the 
profound influence of indexical semiosis 
to frame conceptual/linguistic advances. 
Index, the prime catalyst from the senso-
rimotor individuation to social and logical 
individuations, must not be overlooked. 
Beyond Nominals:
The “whole object” constraint likewise 
short-circuits investigation of other forms 
of naming: verbs and locatives. While 
nominals individuate objects (emphasizing 
a static goal), verbs often express non-static 
source, path, and goal constituencies. Verbs 
are names for events, states, and actions. 
The naming of events showcases index’s in-
fluence in development; in that action, verbs 
typically select two or three arguments 
(semantically and syntactically). These 
transitive or ditransitive constructions ex-
press a source (often agent), a path (within 
the verb/verb particle), and a receiver and 
object to be received. 
The verb naming constitutes more than 
the individuation of events; it illustrates 
advanced forms of index, movement along 
the paths to goals. Here, the arguments 
are integrated into a spatial and temporal 
episodic frame of reference. The unfolding 
of the index is not an unexpected or sudden 
phenomenon, but it materializes consequent 
to the existence of early spatial primitives. 
The theories of naming and testing need 
to be founded upon the fact that spatial 
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primitives underlie the process of applying 
names to things and the way how verbs 
and locatives characterize events must be 
incorporated. Ignoring frequent reference to 
locations, participants’ orientations within 
spatial fields creates an incomplete picture. 
Spatial boundaries and relations to them are 
unrepresented. 
The names for events and their overex-
tensions are equally, if not more, revealing 
linguistic and cognitive competencies, since 
they express relations, especially spatial 
ones, an endeavor which nouns as names 
are hard-pressed to encode. Motion verbs 
and verbs referring to resultative states of 
affairs have been sorely under-investigated. 
The over-emphasis on nominals as names 
(as opposed to verbs, prepositions or other 
locatives) ignores the existence of spatial 
primitives and undermines the power of 
indexical signs to refer to basic event rela-
tions. This is so, particularly given the very 
nature of prepositions as event situators, 
spatially/temporally. 
Nonetheless, some investigators 
(Tomasello, Merriman 1995; Naigles et 
al. 2009) document the productive emer-
gence of verb use from 1;6 to 2;0. In fact, 
the transitive and intransitive verbs were 
equally likely to be employed, and subjects 
were significantly more likely to be omit-
ted than were the objects: 65 vs. 55 percent 
(Naigles, et al. 2009: 34). The confounding 
factor here appears to be that the 55 per-
cent object omission includes instances in 
which objects were appropriately omitted 
(such that they were implicit) and those for 
which objects were inappropriately omit-
ted. The upshot of these findings to issues 
of naming is that even before relations are 
expressed via adjective-noun combina-
tions, they materialize as names for events 
(verbs). As such, verbs account for naming 
not merely as a referential process, but as a 
relation-based process as well. Merely ac-
counting for reference in the case of nouns 
(matching possible existent object to label) 
is incomplete for verb naming: vital to 
naming actions/states is their sense (their 
constituents). 
Relations (linguistic and extra linguistic) 
pregnant in verb use are diverse: one partici-
pant to a host of event participants (“fall” / 
“see” / “push” / “bring”), event location(s) 
with respect to participants (“come” vs. 
“go”), internal event causation (“feed” 
vs. “eat”), internal event resultativeness 
(“wash” vs. “clean”), event directionality 
(“move” vs. “descend”), and internal event 
process/iterativity (“fixing” vs. “hammer-
ing”). Acquiring names for events is espe-
cially challenging, because they encode the 
participant, directional, and locational struc-
ture necessary to specify in the lexicon how 
the respective event is to be implemented. 
Although not all of the specifications are 
explicit (e.g., “I jumped” implying “onto 
a surface”), the diverse relations (implicit 
or explicit) illustrate the richness of verb 
naming, as opposed to naming with nouns. 
Despite its complexity, verb naming begins 
within a few months of the onset of noun 
naming (Tomasello, Brandt 2009). Their 
conceptual and syntactic complexity is 
obviated by the fact that participants omit-
ted arguments (noun arguments, especially 
subjects), while maintaining the verb in the 
utterance (Naigle et al. 2009). The nominal 
relations subject to omission include agents, 
receivers, experiencers, and instruments. 
These semantic roles are operational in verb 
selection, in that independent of whether 
they are present, they are nonetheless be-
ing implicit. For example, the selection of 
“give” implies the presence of an agent, a 
receiver, and an object, notwithstanding 
whether they are made explicit. In the event 
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that the entity being pushed is established 
in the discourse, one partner might appro-
priately implore the other to “push faster”, 
the entity (perhaps a carriage) is implicit. 
After attentional schemes become 
joint and reciprocal, verbs surface in the 
lexicon. In fact, when the joint attentional 
indexical schemes are in place and when 
children have begun to associate speaker’s 
name with the speaker’s referential inten-
tions, verb naming emerges and becomes 
productive. Concurrently with the onset of 
verb relations surfaces children’s means to 
effectively employ referential cues such 
as a gaze toward an object, to connect the 
intention (of another) to the object being 
named (Baldwin et al. 1996: 3151–3153). In 
short, the verbs as names for actions/states 
rests upon higher level reasoning skills than 
do the nouns and emerge at slightly older 
ages (1;1 – nouns, 1;6 – verbs). More par-
ticularly, the reasoning that underlies verbs 
considers not merely idiosyncratic determi-
nations, but the more objective reasoning 
whose tenets rely on others’ reactions and 
orientations. More importantly, the fact that 
verbs are employed productively by about 
2;0 (Naigles et al. 2009: 52–61) illustrates 
children’s early reliance on higher level 
inferencing skills as a necessary compe-
tence. This appears to be so, given that the 
verb selection is a direct result of children’s 
basic knowledge of the arguments inherent 
to particular verbs—event participants, 
event locations/directionality, and event 
orientation. In short, the relational character 
of verbs places them at the crossroads for 
solidifying primitive spatial-relational sche-
mas and for establishing novel ones: paths, 
sources, and goals. The direct relevance of 
these relational issues to the Index is obvi-
ous: place primitives and the signs which 
represent them are relational by nature (a 
single landmark must be related to another 
point of reference to be interpreted). 
Index is the single most influential ve-
hicle to establish and maintain verb-based 
relational valences inherent to event struc-
ture. Within event structures, the deictic 
names emerge from inside, such that the 
verb lexicon itself selects the nominal 
and locative constituencies with which it 
is likely to appear, e.g., selecting “pull” 
determines the existence of a minimum 
of two nominal constituencies: an agent 
and the involved object. “Push” preempts 
(however implicitly) the additional exist-
ence of a starting point, a path, and an end 
point, and the presence of an instrument 
which orchestrates the pushing is implied. 
The index has a substantive presence here, 
since the agent to patient illustrates a deictic 
trajectory (agent to patient and reverse), as 
does the vector from location A (the begin-
ning point) to location B (the end point). 
Spatial and sequential awareness of the 
canonical event and establishing permuta-
tions of the event’s trajectory indicate the 
influence of the Index in verb naming. The 
productivity in the use of indexical valences 
is vital to early construal not merely of 
cause and effect relations, but to the issue 
of who is initiating what to whom. Verb 
construct competencies underscore the 
degree to which indexical signs facilitate 
the recognition of event contours. Spatial 
primitives: source, containment, motion, 
attachment to surfaces, blocked surfaces, 
path, and goal, reassert their influence so 
that the verbs have a distinctive argument 
trajectory: inclusive of envisioning paths, 
Origos, and goals. These spatial primitives 
are actualized via Index, which (when 
instantiated as a gesture) fixes attention on 
and orients participants, establishes Origos, 
and individuates spatial frames. 
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Conclusion:
As more advanced tracers of episodes, 
verbs measure and name the event trajecto-
ries establishing slots for the orientational 
shifts incumbent to different participants 
which inhabit agent/patient and other 
roles. In this way, Index attends to Objects 
in increasingly more differentiated spaces 
by recognizing more precise divisions of 
geometric and conversational bounded-
ness. In specifying which objects/persons 
are included within particular boundaries 
of different spaces and event participant 
slots, Index (first, by means of pronouns and 
proper names, then, via nouns and verbs) 
separates the existence of the Peircean Ob-
ject (recognizing its context while ascribing 
more singular, more objective meaning: 
emphasizing its being and classifying its 
qualities /properties). 
Although nouns like pronouns individu-
ate, Peirce insists that they do not do that 
naturally. Instead, nouns draw upon com-
monalities across similar Object categories/
classifications. As names, nouns are used to 
show what is being talked about in the light 
of the features of other Objects, not where 
or when. As such, nouns require additional 
competencies, the means to consolidate two 
or more distinct instantiations of an Object. 
The producer and hearer of the noun must 
integrate knowledge and expectations about 
Objects’ function. Verbs, as naming para-
digms, express a still more advanced form 
of Index, an informational event scheme 
drawing upon earlier pronoun and noun 
competencies. In this capacity, verb use en-
tails packing noun-based concepts into ac-
tion structures ultimately highlighting shifts 
in participant roles and path trajectories. 
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